For whatever reason, the language that the EU has chosen to communicate this desire is to specify targets for Greece’s primary budget surplus. Now, there’s not really any good reason to speak in such terms, since what the EU really wants Greece to achieve is a positive overall surplus. But anyway, primary surplus is the lingo the EU has chosen, and that’s the lingo all the journalists and columnists following the story are using, so one has to follow along.
The primary budget surplus is the budget surplus before interest payments. So to achieve a balanced budget, the primary surplus has to equal interest payments. As I've previously calculated, interest payments were around 1.7% of GDP in 2014 and should be around 1.9% of GDP this year, net of previously agreed refunds of interest paid to European central banks and deferred interest on European Financial Stability Facility debt, which gets added to the principal.
So Greece would need to run a primary surplus of at least 1.9% of GDP to balance its budget. Or, to keep its stock of debt from growing, the surplus would have to be a bit more than that, to pay down a bit of debt equal in size to the accumulating deferred interest.
The European adjustment program for Greece targeted a primary surplus of 1.5% of GDP in 2014, 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% of GDP in 2016 on. So the adjustment program was pushing for about a 1% budget surplus this year and about a 2.5% budget surplus in 2016 on.
That might seem clear enough, but the trouble is, not everybody counts the primary surplus the same way. Especially not in Greece, where the religion is Orthodox and the budget data are anything but. So if you’re trying to follow how Greece is doing on those primary budget surplus targets, you need to be aware that there are going to be multiple versions of the story.
Some variations are common across countries. A primary budget balance might refer only to the central government, or it might refer to the consolidated public sector, which in Europe is usually called “general government.” A primary budget balance usually excludes privatization revenues, but might include them – there’s not really any agreement on how to handle those. The targets Europe set for Greece refer to the general government primary surplus, not including privatization proceeds.
You might have read, including in my own previous article, that Greece ran a primary budget surplus of €1.87b or just over 1% of GDP in 2014. The number comes from the Greek government’s State Budget Execution Monthly Bulletin.
But that’s a central government primary surplus, and includes privatization receipts.
And it also includes something highly unorthodox: refunds of interest payments. Since the primary balance excludes interest payments from the expense line, it’s obviously weird and misleading not to also exclude refunds of them from the income line.
This table shows how to reconcile Greece’s published primary balance numbers as best as possible with the standard method:
The Greek count of the primary balance takes state budget revenue, subtracts state budget expenditure and adds back interest payments. The standard method used in the adjustment program takes consolidated government revenues, subtracts interest refunds, privatization receipts and consolidated government expenditure, and adds back interest payments.
By the standard method the primary surplus was €1.17b or 0.7% of GDP, or about €700m less than Greece’s reported primary surplus. The figures for consolidated revenues and expenditures come from a separate government budget bulletin.
Note that any count the EU might eventually publish would surely differ. The EU would use Eurostat data on general government revenues and expenditure, which differ from Greece’s and haven’t been published yet for 2014. And the EU would also make other technical adjustments (see page 22 for the lowdown). The EU doesn’t usually publish primary surplus figures except for countries in adjustment programs. The IMF will eventually publish a 2014 primary surplus figure for Greece, but its method differs from the EU’s and Greece’s.
It’s worth pointing out that as of the end of November the previous Greek government was running a consolidated primary surplus of 1.5% of GDP, by the standard method. But to be fair, the main reason the budget balance deteriorated so sharply in December was simply that the government caught up on budgeted spending. The details are in the table below, which uses the same two series of monthly bulletins going back to September.
Central government expenditure was €1.83b behind budget at the end of November and only €0.98b behind budget by the end of December.
It’s also true that there was a serious deterioration of tax collection in December: tax revenues fell short of target by €706m in December, bigger than the shortfall for the whole of January-November. Rumors have it that January was even worse.
You might notice another, bigger shortfall of interest refunds. That’s because European central banks hadn’t yet refunded the roughly €1.9b of interest that Greece paid them during the year. I’m not sure they ever actually planned to pay the refunds before year-end. But in any case, those refunds are now being withheld because Greece has quit the adjustment program.
(UPDATE: Overall revenues were €935m or 20% short of target in January, according to the January state budget bulletin. That compares to revenues that were €907m or 14% short of target in December, excluding the €1.9b of withheld interest refunds. The January bulletin didn’t provide separate figures for tax revenue.)
(UPDATE2: I clarified the IDs of the budget lines in the second table. “State Budget” is the core central government, not including some off-budget central government bodies. “General government” is the consolidated central and local government sector, but these are advance numbers published by the Greek finance ministry, which differ from those published later by Eurostat.)
(JULY 2 UPDATE: The IMF has confirmed: zero primary surplus in 2014 by their method. I’ll be posting an update soon.)
Very impressive blog (I came here from Marginal Revolution).
ReplyDeleteReally dumb question: what's the difference between "General government" and "State budget"? Is that (very roughly) like "Federal" vs "Provincial"? So if we add the two together, total government spending is 75% of GDP, even before we include municipal government spending? Does Greece even have a private sector any more? Or am I double-counting where I shouldn't be?
On second thoughts, some of those government expenditures must be transfer payments (like pensions), rather than expenditures on goods and services, and those transfer payments are then taxed back, so the private sector can be bigger than 25% of GDP.
DeleteHi Nick, many thanks for the complement, and for the inaugural comment. I was wondering when someone would break the ice. I like your blog as well.
ReplyDelete"State budget" is the term the Greek government uses for its core central government. It's basically the equivalent of the US federal government budget without the off-budget central government bodies.
"Central government" is the EU term for the consolidated central government. It's sort of equivalent to the US federal government consolidated budget, and includes those off-budget central government bodies.
"General government" is the EU term for the whole public sector, from the central down to the local level, but excludes "market corporations" even if they are publicly owned.
So general government includes the State Budget consolidated with a whole lot of other public sector stuff, including off-budget central government and local government.
Both State Budget and general government include transfer payments. These are total budget figures, not just the final spending excluding transfer payments as you would see in an expenditure-side breakdown of GDP.
"Central government," "General government" and "market corporation" are all defined in gory detail in the European System of Accounts, which is the EU version of the UN System of National Accounts, or so I'm led to believe. It's a big e-book and you can have it for free: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5925693/KS-02-13-269-EN.PDF/44cd9d01-bc64-40e5-bd40-d17df0c69334
By the way the ESA has a special role in the history of the Greek crisis, because of the peculiar way that the EU set up the euro's defenses against badly behaving euro members. All governments were made able to draw practically unlimited Eurosystem funds so long as it wasn't from their own national central bank. The way they could do this was to sell bonds to a bank from another EU country which could then post those bonds as collateral for funding from its national central bank. So far as I'm aware there were and are no volume limits on that practice, or at the very least until 2009 there were none low enough to matter (the ECB has many secret rules, so I can't really know). The only defense was the Maastricht treaty's limits on the size of general government deficits.
So that's why the Karamanlis government spent years carefully deceiving Eurostat, hiding the ways it wasn't following the ESA, in order to conceal the size of its deficit so that it could continue indirectly tapping Eurosystem funds. And that's why everything collapsed so hard in late 2009 and early 2010 when Papandreou admitted to Eurostat what had been going on.
Thanks Tom. I was double-counting (at least twice!).
Delete"All governments were made able to draw practically unlimited Eurosystem funds so long as it wasn't from their own national central bank. The way they could do this was to sell bonds to a bank from another EU country which could then post those bonds as collateral for funding from its national central bank."
I'm going to have to think more about that one. Interesting.
I plan to write something on it when I have time, after I mull it over some more myself.
DeleteThe fact that banks from around the EU were funding their purchases of Greek bonds by posting them as collateral to their national central banks is well known, but the importance of it to allowing Greece to run up such large debts until Eurostat started cracking down on them hasn't really made it into the public discussion so far as I've found. Although there was some discussion in real time by the ratings agencies, who as late as early April 2010 were saying that as long as the ECB accepts it as collateral there's no liquidity crisis here.
There are understood to be caps on national central banks lending to and acceptance of collateral issued by their home-country government in the Eurosystem's secret Agreement on Net Financial Assets, but nobody knows the details.
Since references to the Agreement on Net Financial Assets are rare enough that even this comment pops up in search results, I should correct myself: ANFA definitely regulates Euro Area national central banks' extension of credit to EA government bodies and ownership of their debt securities, but I'm pretty sure says nothing about their acceptance of EA government securities as collateral in connection with monetary policy operations. The full name of the treaty is "Agreement on Net Financial Assets not Related to Monetary Policy."
DeleteSo I now think I was wrong saying that EA governments can more easily receive indirect ECB funding via other EA country banks than from domestic banks. They can draw both ways with equal ease, limited only by the EU's rules on excessive deficits and the ECB's rules on minimum credit ratings of collateral.
Tom,
ReplyDeleteA very powerful blog, it is always amazing how the story is always more complicated than it appears on the surface. With that in mind, I'd like your take on my pet solution to this mess...
1. Create a new set of Greek bonds that converts the entire stock of existing debt to 0% interest for an extended period of time, say 15 years. While interest payments would not be required, there would be some amount of yearly principle reduction...say 1% of GDP or even just 0.5%. This would mean the debt would shrink relative to GDP and in absolute terms by the time the balloon payment is due.
2. Bonds held by the Central bank and member nations would be swapped for the new bonds. A sinking fund would be established and administered by a 3rd party to pay off any privately held bonds either as they come due or if they can be purchased from the market at par.
3. some portion of the stockpile of new debt would be sold off each year to the market at whatever price it will fetch. Perhaps Greek banks, pension funds and other financial players could be required to hold some portion of their assets in the form of the bonds.
4. Most important, Greece is then cut off from borrowing. It has 15 years of 'breathing room' before it would have to float a large new bond issue to pay off the debt. Greece could issue new bonds if it wished but the ECB would not accept them as collateral, they would be purely at the mercy of the market. On the other hand, if Greece used the 15 years to maintain even a small primary surplus with positive GDP growth, the debt burden would shink both as principle is reduced and positive economic growth makes the debt smaller. Since a default crises will be delayed by over a decade, the rest of Europe can take a pause. Since there's a clear line between the old debt and any new debt, it will be easier for the EU to get out of the business of guaranteeing ever increasing Greek debt levels. Also while Greece may try to sell bonds after this 'final bailout', they would be competiting in the market with the bonds being sold off in #3.
Of course the best outcome would be that in 15 years Greece returns to the fold stronger and still in the EU and using the Euro. The only cost would be the rest of Europe receives less interest revenue from holding Greek debt, but then it isn't like Europe is being held up by clipping coupons on Greek bonds, rates are at 0% already so no one is earning much in interest anymore. The worst outcome would be that Greek just refuses to honor the 'balloon payment' in 15 years and we have a default. Time works on both sides, though. In 15 years GDP growth would likewise shrinking the impact of a total default on Greek debt.
Hi Boonton, welcome. I haven't been paying attention to the issue of how to handle Greece's long-term debts because, well, they're so long-term. And also quite low-interest for such long debt, around 0.5% to 0.6%. So we're talking about €1b to €1.2b of interest a year of which nearly three-quarters is deferred and added to the principal. It would be some help to Greece to cut that further but it's not an urgent issue. They first have to make a deal with Europe to roll over debt to the ECB and IMF into similar longer-term EU debt and maybe some IMF debt. And they're at a stage where the rest of the EU is exasperated with them, especially since they elected Syriza.
ReplyDeleteThe interest/principal reduction deal you mention sounds in principal fine to me. There's no rule that says states can't lend to other states at negative real rates, and Greece is still deflating, so why not lower its rates below zero? Usually such deals and outright debt forgiveness are reserved for much poorer countries than Greece, but the EU has a strong interest in helping Greece stay in the euro.
I just think that such proposals are extremely unlikely to get anywhere at this point. I don't think anyone wants to be that nice to Tsipras. At best he'll get a rollover into debt on similar terms to the current pile. If all I've predicted on this blog turns out wrong and his relations with Europe warm over time, then such a deal as you suggest might be possible down the road. Or maybe with some other government that emerges after him. Not now.
Isn't a big part of the issue the due dates of this debt? If it was just a matter of paying 1.2B a year in interest no big deal but as debt issues mature they either have to paid off in full or rolled into new bonds. This would take that off the table for nearly a generation while at the same time take the question of new debt off the table....at least it seems workable to me.
DeleteYes, absolutely, the crux of the talks is the terms for rolling over the debt that comes due this year and next, mostly to the Eurosystem and IMF. And what I'm saying is your proposal would do that on better terms than I think the rest of Europe is willing to give right now.
DeleteReally there are two things being discussed: 1) on what terms they will roll over debt payments coming due, and 2) whether Greece will have to pay down debt, or not, or be allowed to borrow more (net). I'm pretty sure they could agree to continue rolling over maturing debts, including even the restructuring holdouts, but not on better terms than they've been doing. I think they could easily relax their former condition that Greece start slightly repaying its debts this year and more next year. The 3% and 4.5% of GDP primary surplus targets for this year and next come to about 0.5% and 2% of GDP net debt repayment, accounting for deferred interest. I could see this year's and maybe even next year's going to zero, but I doubt anyone's willing to let Greece run up more debts here, and I'm sure that writing down old debts is out of the question. Again, I'm not saying your plan wouldn't work or the wise thing to do, just that creditors aren't feeling that generous right now. They don't want to reward Greeks for defying them, which is what electing Syriza was all about. They think that being generous here would only encourage Syriza to miss targets and Spaniards to vote for Podemos.
Sixty per cent of Greek debt is reported as owed to other Euro governments. It is difficult to find out who they actually are and how much is owed to each. On searching the web 60 billion can be found owed to Germany, 40 billion to Italy, 28 billion to Spain, etc. But these figures are not referenced and are just media reports. Perhaps you know where the definitive and complete list is and can post it up here.
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DeleteThe national breakdown for the first €52.9b of EU loans to Greece made in 2010-2011 is here:
http://www.rekenkamer.nl/english/Publications/Topics/EU_governance_to_combat_the_economic_and_financial_crisis/Financial_stability_instruments/Financial_instruments/Greek_loan_facility
That comes directly from a page that used to be up on an EU site but seems to have been taken down.
The other €141.8bn of EU loans to Greece since 2012 are by the EFSF. The EFSF is backed partly by capital injections and mainly by guarantees extended by its owners, which are the 17 members of the Euro before Latvia and Lithuania joined. There's no direct assignment of the capital or guarantees to particular loans. The EFSF also loaned €43.7b to Portugal and Ireland.
Details of EFSF lending are here: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/EFSF%20Financial%20Statements311213.pdf
An explanation of how the capital contributions and guarantees work is here: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf
A breakdown of actual capital contributions as of the end of 2013 (which totaled €28.5b) are on page 10 of this document: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/EFSF%20Financial%20Statements311213.pdf
If I'm following you correctly Tom one of the problems here is that Greece was able to achieve it's large debt load by gaming the European system. First inflate GDP estimates, then borrow from the banks of other European Union members, then when the boom burst the truth is not just poor perception by the major players (which you could say was the problem in the US with the boom in mortgages) but outright deception on the part of the Greeks. Even though political parties have changed several times since then, there is a moral question of how much reward someone who played a bit dirty should get when other European nations have taken on a lot of suffering to maintain fiscal order.
ReplyDeleteBut then I take a step back and ask myself, who decided to ever lend me money? I didn't decide that, banks did and banks didn't just take my word for it but insisted I produced tax returns and pay stubs. Should the EU be in the business of trusting members to correctly report their GDP or should they do it themselves?
Second how much 'punishment' can really be inflicted on a nation? Here I would ask Germany how well did those reparations from WWI work for everyone involved? The problem here seems to be that even with a positive primary surplus, Greece is going to always need 'new loans' to roll over the old ones. So why not cut the cord now by offering something sweet to both sides?
I think my proposal could also be applied to Spain, Italy and any other EU member that wants it. It comes at a cost, after the 'refinancing' the ECB is closed to 'new debt'. This deal would be great for a nation to take *if* it is in primary surplus and can stay there for quite a while. if it cannot then the deal would make it harder for it to run real deficits in the future. The deal also would require a balloon payment when the special bonds mature in 15 years or so, that would require any country taking it to not only maintain at least a token primary surplus but also be prepared to enter the market and borrow a huge lump sum all at once.
Perhaps a deeper problem here is that the EU is a Union without a central government. In the US the Federal Reserve buys and sells short term Federal debt to exercise its monetary policy. The Fed does not have to worry about the quality of debt issued by any of the 50 states. From what I gather, there are no 'Eurobonds' so the ECB has to buy and sell member debt as if everyone was exactly the same.
Maybe the ECB shouldn't buy the debt of its members. What if it purchased US Treasuries or Japanese debt instead? While that sounds a bit crazy it would accomplish the purpose of monetary policy, to add or subtract Euros from the economy. The US debt market is very deep and liquid. The merits or demerits of any EU member's bonds would stand or fall based on what the market thinks of their credit worthiness. The EU would not need to try to browbeat members over whether or not their deficits were too big.
Well, there is still some resentment of the deception from back in 2009 and earlier, even though it was three governments ago. But I don't think that's why it's hard to make a deal here. I think it's that Syriza is seen as overly populist and unrealistic. I think the other European governments are thinking the previous government came so far completely eliminating its overall budget deficit, now Syriza wants to reverse all that and give us the tab.
Deletegearsaer
ReplyDelete